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Abstract: 
 
This paper is an attempt to answer the raw philosophical question of “ti esti state-
terrorism”. It is a critical philosophical analysis of the concept of state-terrorism based upon 
an epistemological discussion, in an effort to re-formulate the question of terrorism by 
making the case that state-terrorism is the mother phenomenon and root of all forms of 
terrorism. My ambition is to contribute to our understanding of terrorism by revealing that, 
in the Greek language which is the language of concepts and philosophy, the term terrorism 
is terrorcracy and literary means state-terrorism, while it belongs to the same family of 
words as democracy, since the suffix –cracy, a recognition that may have the power to open 
new ways of viewing the term and phenomenon of terrorism, if not re-define the whole 
concept by describing it according to the term’s original meaning. Under this logic, 
terrorism would refer to a form of government and a political system. A hypothesis that my 
essay introduces into the philosophical dialogues on terrorism, since it never before has 
been discussed within these terms. State-terrorism is a forbidden term according to legal 
experts, however should not be treated as a sterile term by critical thinkers. 
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Resumen: 
 
Este trabajo aborda la cuestión filosófica y urgente del “ti esti state-terrorism”. El 
ensayo analiza críticamente y filosóficamente el concepto del terrorismo del estado, basado 
en una discusión epistemológica, que intenta re-formular la cuestión del terrorismo, donde 
se argumenta que el terrorismo de estado es el fenómeno inicial y la raíz del terrorismo en 
todas sus formas. Mi aspiración es contribuir a una comprensión del terrorismo que trate de 
revelar cómo en griego –el idioma de los conceptos y la filosofía– el término “terrorismo” 
es “terror-cracia” y significa literalmente el terrorismo del estado; también es parte de la 
misma familia de la democracia, al tener el sufijo “–cracia.” Este reconocimiento puede 
revelar nuevas maneras de ver el concepto y fenómeno del terrorismo, o incluso puede 
ayudar a redefinir el concepto por completo al ponerlo en sintonía con su sentido original. 
Según este razonamiento, el terrorismo se referiría a una forma del gobierno y a un sistema 
político. En mi ensayo introduzco esta hipótesis al hilo de diálogos filosóficos sobre el 
terrorismo, ya que el asunto no se había discutido nunca antes en estos términos. “El 
terrorismo del estado” es un término prohibido según los expertos jurídicos, pero los 
pensadores críticos no deben tratarlo como término estéril. 
 
Palabras Clave: Estado-terrorismo, estudios críticos sobre terrorismo, filosofía, 
derecho, derechos humanos 
 
 
 
 
Prolegomena 
 
Ti esti State-terrorism, and what this idea is referring to, is the question to be dealt with 
in the present essay. “Ti esti” literary means “what it is” and can be traced back to Socrates, 
Plato and Aristotle. Is more specifically concerned with the essence and/or the fundamental 
elements that a subject or idea is comprised by, without which would seize to be what it is. 
Ti esti, is claimed to be the first question philosophers asked, and by its expression initiated 
a distinctive philosophical enquiry into the quest for the definitions of “things”. Is a ticket 
for a deeper than a “what it is” question, because “ti esti” refers to the essence of the subject 
to be questioned.  
My purpose is to examine the hypothesis that, terrorism means State-terrorism by 
definition, and test the suggestion deriving from my study's findings, that the essence of 
State-terrorism is in fact the same as terrorism’s. I am examining this possibility of a shared 
essence, following the explanatory guidelines of such a possibility, outlined and defended 
from Aristotle within his Metaphysics. My ambition however is to look through, yet 
beyond the pragmatic, positive, empirical assertions that endeavor to portray reality, and 
into the normative of what should and ought to be, by attempting to contribute into the 
quest of defining terrorism, through the act of designating State-terrorism. As it has been 
affirmed: "Epistemology, too, can be seen as normative, in so far as it is concerned with the 
justification of our beliefs, and with judging the rightness or wrongness of our cognitive 
states."1 
 
1 See: Proudfoot, Michael, A.R., Lacey, “The Routledge Dictionary of Philosophy”, 2009, p. 277. 
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It is beyond dispute, that philosophy has an unbreakable bond with the Greek language, 
and it seems to me that whether we are readers or writers of philosophy, we have to 
acknowledge this fact, and trust into the teachings the Greek world have offered to 
humanity. However, I have been asked before why to give any validity to the Greek 
language today, and why to believe that it may enhance our understanding of philosophy, 
political or legal concepts. I should devote some paragraphs into illuminating the 
significance of such a belief, since my research has been greatly inspired by that fact and 
founded on utilizing the ancient Greek teachings and language. I am not going to defend the 
Greek language in its totality, but as far as philosophy is concerned it is definite that the 
contribution and value of that language is inestimable.  
The terminology of political theory is being comprised in its majority by terms 
originating in Greek. As well as concepts, ways of philosophizing, syllogistic processes, 
theories, ideas, notions and principles, are similarly of Greek origin. It is true that most 
modern philosophical theories or at least their majority can be traced back to the ancient 
Greeks. Consciously I interrupt this reasoning, and by closing this intervention, allow me to 
simply argue, that, if democracy, politics, or philosophy, are terms relevant today, and since 
we are still struggling to understand them and decode them, then we should agree that 
looking back at their birth and origin, the environment of their emergence, and the cultural 
background as well as historical evolution within the geographical part that this explosion 
of ideas has taken place, may add into our comprehension of these terminological 
constructions in incalculable and unexpected ways. 
It is a given, that in 2013, from academia to politics, has been impossible to describe 
successfully what terrorism is, and consequently to reach agreement into a single definition. 
This essay is re-formulating the question of terrorism, from a critical terrorism studies 
standpoint, in an attempt to redirect the philosophical dialogues on the phenomenon. 
Scholars, such as Noam Chomsky have repeatedly stressed the need for further scholarly 
engagement with this field of study and argued for the responsibility of philosophers, to 
reflect on State-terrorism & terrorism, in order to clarify and define the concepts 
adequately, and this is where my work intends to pay a small contribution. 
It seems to me, that there is a need to employ different disciplines, in order to explain 
sufficiently my thesis. The hypothesis I am examining, aspires to serve as a critical 
contribution to our understanding of terrorism, and my discussion contains findings, 
reached through a well premeditated methodological process, which travels from 
philosophy to law and from a critical terrorism studies to critical legal studies, while 
approaching on occasions at the unconcealedness of the "aletheia"2 in language. 
Disregarding the criticisms advocating against the existence of State-terrorism as a 
phenomenon, crime, or concept, this article aspires to deliver strong reasons and 
justifications of the opposite, by stressing that State-terrorism is indeed an existing 
phenomenon, not only of our modern era, but existing from the beginning of political 
thought, and the formation of the organized State, dating as back as democracy, and 
according to the theory developed and examined in my research, State-terrorism is not only 
an existing concept, but it might very well be, that this is what terrorism’s original meaning 
is all about.  
 
 
2 By aletheia I refer to the literal meaning of the term. A-letheia comprised by the prefix a- that expresses 
negation or absence, and the –letheia, which literally means: “forget”, “conceal”. So, the Greek word for "truth", 
aletheia (ἀλήθεια), meaning "un-forgetfulness" or "un-concealment". 
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Allow me to anticipate, that my main argument is based on the realization that in 
ancient and modern Greek the term describing terrorism is terrorcracy (from τροµοκρατία – 
to tromocratia – terrorcracy), given that this term had been constructed with the suffix –
cracy, just as democracy or aristocracy, indicates that this terminological construction was 
meant to be used in the political context, referring to a political system. 
My hypothesis is based on an examination of the original meaning of the term, by 
travelling back in the history of its conceptual development and terminological creation 
within the Greek language, and proceeds by employing the vehicles of a Socratic 
methodology, while in cases a modern Derridian logic. By doing that, I was led to examine 
what are the differences of the term in today’s language in comparison to the past usage of 
the word, and to determine the ways and possible reasons for the departure of its original 
meaning.  
Before I continue, I feel the need to return to my previous reasoning and stress the 
importance of knowing Greek when studying Philosophy. The majority of the Greek terms 
are transliterated into the Latin alphabet, but the importance of the capacity to comprehend 
the philosophical terminology which in its majority originates in the Greek language, 
should not be overlooked or diminished, as well as the obligation on philosophers to 
cultivate the ability of identifying a term wherever it may appear in a script. In my view, 
not knowing Greek would mean for a reader of philosophy, what not knowing the value of 
numbers for a mathematician.  
Thus, I ended up talking about truth; truth that as a term in the Greek language means to 
uncover, to un-forget or remember again. The literal meaning of the word ἀ–λήθεια 
[aletheia= truth] is the state of not being hidden, or forgotten, of being uncovered. Based on 
that reading of truth as unconcealedness, I have advanced into a challenge to uncover the 
hidden or forgotten truth of the term terrorism and elucidate in a form of a reminder what 
philosophers and scholars have led to forget. As Heidegger claims: "To say that an 
assertion "is true" signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion 
asserts, points out, “lets” the entity “be seen” (απόφανσις) in its uncoveredness."3 In that 
line of reasoning, Sir David Ross’s interpretation of Aristotle holds that:  
 
All teaching and all learning, Aristotle points out, start from pre-existing knowledge. The 
knowledge thus presupposed is of two types of fact; it is knowledge “that so-and-so is,” or 
knowledge of “what the word used means.” With regard to some things, the meaning of the 
words being quite clear, all that need be explicitly assumed is that the thing is so; this is true, for 
instance, of the law that everything may with truth either be affirmed or be denied.4 
 
According to this logic, knowledge can be obtained from the examination of "what the 
word used means" since in our case the word “tromokratia” which means terrorism and was 
constructed by the ancient Greeks, has a meaning that is apparent, clear and recognizable. I 
am parallelizing this equivalent in meaning, scope and function ancient Greek term, with 
the modern term terrorism, (terrorism which I am treating as a neologism in this part of my 
discourse) in order to discover whether there is any crucial elements that could assist us in 
our comprehension of the phenomenon of terrorism, and whether there is any essentials that 
we are missing, and consequently their absence is blocking the scholarly comprehension of 
the concept of terrorism. 
 
3 Heidegger, Martin, “Being and Time”, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, London: SCM 
Press, 1962, p. 261. 
4 Ross, David, “ARISTOTLE” With an introduction by John Ackrill, 6th Ed., New York, Routledge, 1995, p. 41. 
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It is astonishing to realize that nobody so far has talked about or discovered that the 
original meaning of the term and subsequently in many cases the original form of terrorism 
or mother phenomenon, has and always had as a starting point the State and therefore in the 
majority of the cases involved in that terrain, to talk about terrorism is to talk about State-
terrorism. A conclusion reached by exercising the simplest reading of the term in its 
original form found in ancient (and modern) Greek, driven by the realization, that we are 
acting as political animals and exercising political thought, under the agreed understanding 
that our whole political systems, from raw material to constructed forms, are to find their 
origin in Greece, just like Democracy is, and just as her sister term Tromocracy (which is 
the Greek term for Terrorism, with “tromo” meaning terror), or allow me the construction, 
just as Terrorcracy is.  
Aristotle in answering: ti esti to be a citizen? "…relies partly on his own reasoning, 
partly on the ordinary usage of the word."5 Still, in order to know one thing, we need to 
recognize its first cause, its substance or essence (ousia). As Ross6 interpreted the 
Aristotelian view, even if we break down the compound of the entity, it is imperative to 
acknowledge that the why is ultimately reducible to the definition and the final why, is a 
cause and principle. The substance to be revealed refers to the first thing it is comprised by, 
and the last into which is resolved, meaning that this essence is permanently kept. As it was 
mentioned above, terrorism and State-terrorism, from a philosophical perspective, might be 
found to share the same essence, since if we attempt to break down their compounds, 
accompanied by the attribute of “the instrumentalization of terror for political ends”, into 
their last parts, it seems to me, that in both cases we will end up with three elements: State, 
terror, and political goals. While it could be argued that the first and last element that stays 
unchanged in any manifestation or form of terrorism, is a "State of terror".  
I find important to draw the attention of the reader on the fact, that terrorism and State-
terrorism, are more political than legal terms. This is why I find important to elaborate and 
deal with this phenomena by interpreting them through the political theory’s reasoning 
paths and through philosophical analysis, while anticipating that State-terrorism can be 
proven to be more of a political system, rather than just a criminal act, or better put, a 
criminal political system. 
 
The Essence of State-Terrorism 
 
In philosophical terms, to talk about essence, is to discuss the attributes or 
characteristics that makes a being or entity, what it fundamentally or essentially is, by 
discovering its "ousia" or in Aristotelian terms the "substance" of the entity in question, 
which if deprived of that core substance, would lose its identity. 
It is a common assertion throughout the majority of the Platonic dialogues, within 
which one can observe the customary usage of the ti esti (ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙ) question; as for instance 
in Laches, Euthyphro, Charmides, Protagoras, or in Meno where the proposition is 
expressed, that in acquiring knowledge or have episteme of an entity, it is imperative to first 
of all discover the essence of it, a syllogism which is initiated by asking ti esti the thing of 
our syllogistic investigation, the idea that we are trying to understand and define. While 
afterwards and only then, to base one’s knowledge of other matters about this entity, on the 
explicit knowledge of its essence. (Meno 71b, 86d-e, 100b). It is clear that for Plato, just as 
 
5 Idem p.260.  
6 Ross, W. D., “Aristotle's Metaphysics”, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924, Book 1, Part 3. 
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it was for Socrates, the essence of a thing is a fundamental unchangeable feature of it, and 
there is a priority of discovering, explicitly required, by the location of the question “ti esti” 
to be in the top of the ladder.  
It should be noted, that the Socratic inquiry through asking ti esti, directs the focus of 
the inquirer into identifying what a thing is in itself. As Aristotle7 himself acknowledges, 
Socrates was the first to fix his mind on the universality of definitions and the struggle to 
discover the essence of things in the political, or within ethics, through expressing the ti esti 
question, which by principle triggers a quest of discovering the essence of the entity, in 
questions of “horismos” (definition). 
Because what Plato did within his dialogues, was to place Socrates in a state of 
puzzlement and “aporia”, while leading him into initiating quests for definitions through the 
expression of the ti esti question. While in most cases, Socrates was depicted as being 
unsatisfied with the path of reasoning the interlocutors were taking in their attempts to 
answer his inquiry, and although there is not a really clear-cut methodological procedure 
one should take, in order to be in lines of the “correct practice” of this form of questioning, 
however the relevant literary review can be found of assistance in illuminating certain 
requirements, that are distilled from Plato’s writings in describing the Socratic questioning 
of the definitions of things.  
Dr. Politis in a very relevant article titled "what is behind the ti esti question"8 proceeds 
in lining up the most important and relevant requirements of bringing this question into 
existence. However as Dr. Politis acknowledges, and is in line with the underlying belief of 
my engagement with the ti esti question, this question is not of Platonic property, but is in 
the Greek as in the English language, a call for a standard for a thing’s being, a demand for 
understanding and defining, by indication to which we can conclude of a thing, whether it is 
such as it is, through the employment of the requirements of: "(a) generality, (b) unity, and 
(c) explanatoriness". However he concludes that there is nothing behind or before the ti esti 
question, since any priority over other inquiring method or question has not been proved 
necessary or as a pre-requisite, according to the Socratic engagement with the question, 
except and it is notable in the case of "aporia", which in certain dialogues might be fiercer. 
Yet, I have made a conscious choice of words, and methods, by using the ti esti 
question, through which I am attempting to follow the same path of reasoning, while 
challenging the definitional inadequate knowledge that is to date offered to us, and I am 
struggling to discover whether the standards of the generality, unity, and explanatoriness 
requirements mentioned above could be satisfied, in the process of discovering elements 
that may be of further help into the definitional struggles of the concept of terrorism, and 
State-terrorism in particular.  Since the generality requirement, always according to Politis, 
is sufficient in providing an answer to the ti esti question in its basic sense, and offering 
something that could serve as a standard for a thing’s being. Since according to the basic 
sense of the ti esti question, there is no evident justification to reject a particular thing as an 
example of a thing that is, instead of an abstract general account, that can serve as such a 
standard. While it should be anticipated that in the case of State-terrorism, even the 
requirement of unity and explanatoriness could be satisfied, while the standard I am trying 
to discover in our case could be better explained in terms of its essence, and the basic 
elements that without which it would seize to be what it is.  
 
7 Ross, W. D., “Aristotle's Metaphysics”, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1924. Book 1, Part 6, p 15. 
8 Politis, Vasilis, "What is behind the ti esti question?" in J. Fink Ed. “The Development of Dialectic from 
Plato to Aristotle”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, Pp. 232 –260. 
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These elements will be later on discussed in the pages to come, but, as it has been 
acknowledged, and may illuminate the syllogism behind my particular discourse, one 
should consider the Aristotelian methodology and questioning of essence for the purposes 
of a definition, through which: "Aristotle means that to ask whether A is, is to ask whether 
there is an intelligible essence answering to the name, and that to ask what A is to seek to 
unfold this essence in a definition."9 
However, taking an aporetic path, it does not automatically mean that you are going to 
reach a solution to your problem. What I mean is, that most of Plato’s dialogues that are 
demonstrating this methodological process, of the Socratic aporia in questions of definition, 
they end up in their majority by maintaining this aporetic state, without real satisfaction of 
acquiring definitional knowledge. However, this is not an unbreakable rule, since in 
Protagoras for instance, the dialogue ends with a firm answer to the question of whether or 
not virtue can be taught.10  
It is worth noting that according to the “Principle of the Priority of Definition for 
Knowledge”, “knowing the definition of F is the one and only way of knowing whether or 
not F is G. Common to the traditional reading and the interpretation I am proposing, these 
passages are addressed to Plato’s important distinction between the ti esti question (what is 
it?) and the poion esti question (what is it like?).”11 So, if I apply this principle to my 
research, it seems plausible to argue, that knowing the definition of terrorism is the only 
way of knowing whether State-terrorism is terrorism. 
 
Is Terrorism by Definition State-Terrorism? 
 
In the introduction of “Philosophy in a time of terror”12, Borradori claims that 
philosophy has a crucial contribution to make to the understanding of terrorism, she is in a 
way inviting philosophers into a dialogue, by emphasizing the necessity faced by 
philosophers, to assume the responsibility of philosophy in assessing the importance of a 
present event. 
There are many scholars that have accepted a broad definition according to which 
terrorism is simply politically or ideologically motivated violence that is directed against 
civilians or non-combatants. There are different trends of dealing with the theory of 
terrorism, that they have even been categorized13, into orthodox, radical or moderate 
terrorism studies. 
The phenomenon of terrorism has fueled endless debates and caused numerous 
controversial definitions without accomplishing a comprehensive description. What is 
terrorism is a question that has not met a satisfactory answer.  
''Whether terrorism should be treated primarily as an international crime or should be 
viewed mainly as a political problem [which may have international criminal elements], has 
been debated by the international legal community for years.”14 We are witnessing for 
 
9 Ross, David, “ARISTOTLE” With an introduction by John L. Ackrill, 6th Ed., New York, Routledge, 1995. 
p. 49. 
10 See: V. Politis / Phronesis 57 (2012) 209-239 p.213. 
11 Idem p. 211. 
12 Borradori, Giovanna, “Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques 
Derrida”, University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
13 Franks, Jason, “Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism: Orthodox Terrorism Theory and Beyond”, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006. 
14 Rosalyn Higgins, The General International Law of Terrorism, Terrorism and International Law, eds. 
Rosalyn Higgins and Maurice Flory, London: Routledge, 1997, p. 21. 
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decades, the attempts of the international law-making organs to create a complete and legal 
bounding document to cover the phenomenon of international terrorism in its entirety, but 
the issue of state-terrorism is repeatedly avoided. However, there is the undeniable fact of 
state-supported terrorism, and accordingly the relevant international laws covering the 
forbidden acts, like the United Nations Resolution 1373, but there are still a number of 
unresolved issues, and numerous shadowed areas that shout for clarification. Yet, this is the 
closest, “western” international law has come to state-terrorism, because there are other 
pieces of international law, like in the African Union, or the Arab Convention on Terrorism, 
which are explicitly using the term state-terrorism, but unfortunately these laws do not 
enjoy the universal applicability and power that a United Nations Resolution does. 
By proceeding, allow me to employ the term democracy to strengthen the basis of 
certain ideas. The relevance and importance of the links between the two terms will be later 
on explained in greater detail. Let me clarify though, that I chose to use the term democracy 
as a tool to prove my point, since the majority of the readers have some basic understanding 
of the term and its function. It is not in my intention to analyze the term democracy if this 
analysis is not connected to my discourse on state-terrorism. At this point, I will try to 
attain a justified conceptualization and a philosophical hypothesis driven by language, by 
looking into the relationship of Democracy and State-terrorism or Terrorcracy, the most 
relevant link will be celebrated by recognizing that democracy and terrorism, in the Greek 
language, belong to the same family of words, and share the suffix kratos, while another 
connection, is the possibility of a democratic State using terror as a tool, as means and form 
of government.  
It is also in the purposes underlining this paper, the parallel consideration of the 
hypothesis, that state-terrorism can take the form of a political system, and a form of 
government or an executive tool, where for instance the governmental power is preserved 
through the fueling of terror within the population, examples can be found from the Arab 
world to America, and from Asia, to the former USSR. A noteworthy idea comes from 
Michael Stohl15 and George A. Lopez, which argue that, terrorism carried out by a State, 
can take an institutionalized form, which has been developed as a product of changes that 
appeared after World War II. In this line of reasoning, state-terrorism takes the form of 
foreign policy, shaped by the presence and use of weapons of mass destruction. The 
normalization of such violent behavior led to an increased international toleration and silent 
legitimation, as long it was employed by States. We are talking about a “legalization” of 
harm and acts, which had earlier been labeled terroristic and criminal. 
Advancing in my analysis, it would be useful to consider the genealogical style of 
deconstruction, which recalls the history of a concept, since it is being used as another 
method of analysis and examination of the concept of state-terrorism. As Derrida has said: 
“So we have to go back to the Greek origin, not in order to cultivate the origin or in order to 
protect the etymology, the etymon, the philological purity of the origin, but in order first of 
all to understand where it comes from...”16. Yet, the kind of deconstruction I am engaging 
with is closer to the Platonic intellectual tradition and his teacher's maieutic analysis. 
 
Under this logic, the word democracy derives from the Greek word, “democratia” 
(δηµοκρατία in Greek), formed from the roots demos (gr. δήµος), “people”, “the mob, the 
many” and “kratos” (gr. κράτος) “rule” the holder of power. My hypothesis is based on the 
 
15 Stohl, Michael & Lopez, George A., “Terrible beyond Endurance? : The Foreign Policy of State-terrorism”, 
Greenwood Press, 1988. 
16 http://hydra.humanities.uci.edu/derrida/vill2.html [Retrieved on 12 March 2012]. 
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fact that, in the Greek language, where the term democracy originates from, the word 
democracy and the word terrorism have the same root and belong to the same family of 
words, since both terms share their second synthetic “kratos”, which can be translated as 
power, holder of power or State. Keep in mind that the terms describing political systems in 
Greece, were mainly consisted by –kratos or –arche. Kratos being by far the worst and 
normally was referring to abusive forms of political power. Yet, democracy’s popularity led 
her to evolve into a more inclusive system, and has covered up over the centuries this 
negatively charged value. 
A linguistic analysis of the terms in question follows below. In that sense, from Greek, 
“Δηµοκρατία – Τροµοκρατία” transliterates in English as “Democratia – Tromocratia”. So, 
“democratia” is in the English language the term democracy, and “tromocratia” is the 
modern word terrorism, with tromo translating as terror, and the substitution of the suffix –
kratos by the suffix -ism. 
Tromocratia (terrorism), then etymologically means the “tromo-cratia” or “terror-cracy” 
in which the holder of power is the “kratos” [the State], and keeps this power under control 
through the tool of terror. Since we are dealing with a polysynthetic term, which is 
comprised by two synthetics from which the first signifies the “who”, like in our case the 
terror, and the second synthetic and suffix indicates the “what”. Under this logic, if we use 
an analogy with Democracy, we could say that, in terrorcracy the people are no more the 
possessors of power but terror is. The difference in the two terms can be found in the first 
part of the word, the “demos” (people), in the word demo-cratia, and the “tromo” (terror) in 
the term tromo-cratia. The second part is the same (and is defined as the power and control, 
and the holder of power, or State), then the first part of the terms constitutes who is the 
holder, indicates who has the power the control and in the case of democracy is the people, 
“demos”, in the case of terrorism, “tromocratia”→ “tromo-cracy” or →terrorcracy, the 
holder of power is the terror.  
According to this reading, terrorism is dictating its lexical meaning17 and it seems to me, 
that this new interpretation could serve as a vehicle for our better understanding of the 
phenomenon of terrorism and state-terrorism in particular. 
The suffix –cracy18 in the term tromocracy, which refers to forms of government, has 
not been transferred in the international literature as tromocracy, in contrast with 
democracy, autocracy, aristocracy and so on and so forth, which have been adopted 
unchanged. It seems plausible to ask at this point, whether a natural transliteration from 
Greek into Latin, with a more accurate representation of the term, by preserving the 
originally attributed suffix –kratos, since its importance and the extra value that it attributes 
to the term cannot be emphasized enough, entailed the danger of referring automatically 
into a political system and consequently the word to describe and mean by definition state-
terrorism. It is undeniable a good and useful question in reflecting on the matter, and the 
reasons that may have justified such a departure of the original term. In my view it is more 
likely that this negligence occurred due to the scholarly ignorance about the importance of 
preserving the integrality of the terms referring to political systems in the process of 
translating philosophical Greek scripts and theories. The act of translation has more power 
than we attribute to it. It can alter the meaning of a script and can deform it, or even change 
the function of terms. 
 
17 In semantics, the message conveyed by words, sentences, and symbols in a context. See: 
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/329791/language/27173/Lexical-meaning [Retrieved on 21 June 2012]. 
18 World English Dictionary: suffix, -cracy, indicates a type of government or rule: plutocracy , theocracy. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/-cracy [Retrieved on 03 May 2012]. 
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It is interesting, to examine the fact that terrorism has been transferred in English, 
automatically having the ending –ism.19 The suffix –ism, is usually shared by terms 
describing political theories, such as Commun-ism, Liberal-ism, Capital-ism, Anarch-ism. 
An interesting question would be to ask, why the word has been transliterated into Latin, 
having the suffix -ism, and not stay more accurate by keeping the suffix –cracy, like all the 
other terms of the same family had, as democracy or aristocracy. Yet, the suffix -ism, which 
also originates in Greek (see: –ισµός), refers to a system of ideas and is destined to form 
abstract nouns of action. Through this loan of the suffix –ism, the term automatically lost 
the negative reference that –kratos bears and brings to a term, as in the original Greek term 
describing terrorism. If for instance there was a faithful adoption of the word from Greek 
into Latin, as is the case with all the other terms of this family of words, then the suffix -
kratos would be dictating a different route into our understanding of the concept through its 
terminological formation. A research into literature may hold a possible answer to these 
issues, but this would fall outside the purpose and prescribed length of the present paper, 
however, it could shape the theme of a follow-up essay. 
I find important at this point to note, that Greek is a “polysynthetic language”, “a 
polysynthetic or syntactic construction of language...It is that in which the greatest number 
of ideas are comprised in the least number of words.”20 This is what law is trying to do, in 
some way. Is like the legal codification of action, conduct, ideas into legal terminology. 
Where law ends and language begins, is in my view impossible to determine, while the 
significance of philosophy of language in jurisprudence cannot be stressed enough. 
I find essential to mention “deconstruction” at this point. J. Hillis Miller has described 
deconstruction this way: “Deconstruction is not a dismantling of the structure of a text, but 
a demonstration that it has already dismantled itself. Its apparently-solid ground is no rock, 
but thin air.”21 That is exactly what I am doing in the present paper, deconstructing in the 
most “brutal” but natural way. I am exercising deconstruction in its most pure and original 
form, by breaking down the construction of language, of language representing a form, a 
structure, into its raw material and previous beings, beings as unique and sole words, that 
were before they were merged to create a new entity into this world, a new word and term, 
and consequently to form, the medium and means of describing a new concept. I am 
exercising deconstruction in this way, or I am according to Miller “demonstrating that the 
text has already dismantled itself”. Deconstruction is an approach, introduced by French 
philosopher Jacques Derrida,22 he also refers to the power of language, in the term of 
“Logocentrism” a term devised by Ludwig Klages in the 1920’s, directing the focus on 
language, since is a synthetic term comprised by logos (Λόγος) which mean words in 
Greek, and centrism (Kεντρικός) which indicate where the central interest and value is. 
Logocentrism is wisely claimed by Jacques Derrida to be manifested in the works of Plato, 
Aristotle, and many other philosophers of the Western tradition. 
Nonetheless, it is claimed in the majority of terrorism literature, that the first 
documented reference on terrorism comes from the Reigns of Terror on 1793, when the 
Jacobins cited this precedent by imposing a Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. 
Although, even in that case, a government imposed the terror, in a form of state-terrorism, 
still, in modern times terrorism refers to terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors. 
 
19 A word ending that indicates action, manner, condition, beliefs or prejudice. See: 
http://myword.info/definition.php?id=ism_1-a [Retrieved on 23 May 2012]. 
20 Patterson, Thomas, “A Social History of Anthropology in the United States”, Berg Publishers, 2006, p.11. 
21 J. Hillis Miller, "Stevens’ Rock and Criticism as Cure", Georgia Review 30, 1976, p. 34. 
22 Derrida, Jacques, “Of Grammatology”, G. Spivak trans., Baltimore, The J.H. University Press, 1974. 
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My reading of terrorism is based on the fact that the term was in existence centuries 
before, in ancient Greece, enjoying its existence next to political construction such as 
democracy. 
Aristotle, for example, criticized the use of terror by tyrants against their subjects.  
Terrorism is as old as the existence of the organized State, or as the ancient Greeks have 
named –kratos which would translate as power, for example, in the Greek mythology 
originating more than 3000 years ago, the Kratos is depicted as a person with sisters the 
Violence and the Victory. This myth demonstrates the strong connection of the State with 
violence and consequently fear, and its well-established understanding of such a connection 
by its representation in mythology.23 
In ancient Athens for instance, a well-known terroristic attack24 would be the 
destruction of the Hermon25, dating back before the 5th century BC. 
The ancient Greeks were explicitly saying, “control the people through their fear of the 
divine and the rage of the gods”. A belief and statement that can be found in ancient drama 
and tragedies amongst other philosophical writings, demonstrating the instrumentalization 
of fear for the purpose of controlling a population and achieving further political goals. If 
that last sentence does not ring a bell, allow me to draw your attention to the orthodox 
terrorism theory and its definitional attempt, which is almost the same. 
It seems plausible to say, that, in order to understand the term and its function we need 
to look at its original meaning, contra the existing beliefs and terminological definitions 
that are based on findings from the 17th century onwards and the “Reign of Terror”.  
One way to start this new understanding of the term could be to view the term from an 
etymon point of view, etymologically then, the term terror-cracy, would refer to a form of 
government by terror, in other words state-terrorism. In this line of reasoning, terrorism is a 
political system and a form of government and the terror holds the power (cracy). There is 
an undeniable necessity to engage in further dialectic examination and analysis of the above 
assumptions, and this essay aspires to fuel the initiation of further dialogues on this theory. 
Logically then, since the two terms, democracy and terrorcracy are being constructed by 
the same roots, the same “raw material”, then they were both originally constructed and 
destined to describe political systems, or forms of government. It is time to put an end to 
this confusion of concepts and terms, by setting the record straight, and illuminating the 
original meaning and purpose of politically fuelled language constructions. 
Terrorism in this line of reasoning, in the Greek language means terror-state, just as 
democracy means peoples-state. If we accept this rightful re-definition of the concept, then 
the chain of events may generate further constitutional implications and trigger the 
necessity to re-consider for instance the unconstitutional criminalization of “terror-cratic” 
practices, since it could not be possible to punish a terror-ist for her beliefs and according 
practices, no more than it is possible to jail a commun-ist for her beliefs, as long as harm to 
others is not involved. This would be against her political freedom of thought, conscious 
and belief. An idea that is clearly contra the current practices prescribed by the counter-
terrorism legislation around the globe, and which initiates a number of legal paradoxes. 
 
 
 
23 Mythology, which had as main function the ethical education of the people. 
24 As in the case of the philosopher Critias, who in 415 BC, has been accused and imprisoned together with 
Alciviades, for the mutilation of the statutes of Hermes. See: http://www.iep.utm.edu/critias/ [Retrieved on 21 
March 2012]. 
25 In my translation, from the original “Αποκοπής των Ερµών”, referring to destruction of the statues of 
Hermes the ancient Greek god serving as the messenger of gods to humans. 
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Law 
 
It is also equally important, to recognize that criminal law, has the capacity and tools, to 
deal with all the different actus reus, that a 'terrorist' may employ to achieve her ends. This 
is the main objection by scholars and practitioners of international law, since they argue 
that we don’t really need a new crime, referring to state-terrorism, given that whatever the 
criminal act, there is an equivalent law to render it punishable. 
However, in my view, trying to fit this extremely long list of actus reus, and the 
problematic relevant mens rea under the umbrella of the term terrorism, is rather an 
impossible task, and it seems to be misleading, since it creates more legal problems than it 
solves.  
Hence, there is a legal detail that makes the difference, and that is that the weight of a 
crime classified as terroristic, is automatically significantly increased. Its immorality and 
severity reflects even in the practical terms of sentencing and punishment. Similarly 
important is the fact that the international legislation, has been working over-time into 
creating a better-organized justice system to deal with these crimes more efficiently. Also, 
the fact that, by making a case in a court of law, as soon as the term terrorism can stand in 
front of a Judge, then we have the initiation of an automatic procedure with a number of 
legal doors opening simultaneously for the better, faster and more effective functioning of 
the legal process and system.  That is to say for instance the immediate consideration of the 
highest possible sentence, amongst other legal tools and procedures available only to 
terrorism cases.  Not to mention the negative side of that coin, through this over-production 
of legal tools which led to grievous violations of human rights, secret prisons, illegal secret 
extraditions and unconstitutional custodial procedures that have mainly damaged any 
justice system that have adopted them, yet, it is still an indicator of the legal “back” doors 
that a terrorist case may open inside a criminal legal system, an illustrating example is the 
case of “Guantanamo bay”. 
It seems to me, that if we successfully manage to recover the meaning of terrorism, the 
well accepted statement, that 'historically, terrorism has been the tactic of the weak against 
the strong', can be proven to be deceptive. 
There has been a plethora of drafts and pieces of international and national legislation 
regulating terrorism, yet, little and inadequate expansion on state-terrorism, except in the 
case of state-supported terrorism, or State terror. This information can be better evaluated, 
by the mobilization of techniques that Comparative Law has to offer. 
In this line of reasoning, a bright exception is the Arab Convention on Terrorism, which 
States in Article 3, “Contracting States undertake not to organize, finance or commit 
terrorist acts or to be accessories thereto in any manner whatsoever.”26 In this law, the 
lawmaker clearly forbids the State from assuming the role of the perpetrator of the crime of 
terrorism. The legitimate user of violence as the State is being called, must ‘not commit 
terrorist acts”. The crime of state-terrorism, exists in national and regional legislation, but 
does not enjoy a universal applicability and actual international legal consensus. However, 
its existence in a legally binding document, as the Convention mentioned, as well as in the 
Organization of African Union’s Convention27, could be plausible to say that it proves its 
actual existence as a crime. 
 
26 Arab Convention on Terrorism, Part Two, Principles of Arab Cooperation for the Suppression of Terrorism, 
Chapter I, The Security Field, Section I, Measures for the prevention and suppression of terrorist offences:       
Article 3. 
27 Organization of African Union Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. 
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Noteworthy is Resolution 1373, which obliges all States to criminalize assistance for 
terrorist activities. However there are many States that provide assistance to terrorist 
organizations, including some of the greatest powers of the globe; western State’s activities 
which could easily fall under the prohibited acts of terrorism, under the European’s Arrest 
Warrant28 list of terrorist acts, the Academic Definition of Terrorism, or the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.29 
Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, viewed as ground-breaking thinkers in relation to 
state-terrorism30 argued that “the distinction between State and non-state terror is morally 
relativist, and distracts from or justifies state-terrorism perpetrated by favored States, 
typically those of wealthy and developed nations”.31 Chomsky described low-intensity 
warfare as state-terrorism, and writes: “The U.S. is officially committed to what is called 
low-intensity warfare... If you read the definition of low-intensity conflict in army manuals 
and compare it with official definitions of terrorism in army manuals, or the U.S. Code, you 
find they're almost the same.”32 
It is not the only case that the USA, has been accused and found to be acting in 
accordance with the purposes of state-terrorism. There have been many accusations against 
the country, like from Latin America, and the Nicaraguan case. 
Thought-provoking ideas on state-terrorism, can be found in the moral analysis of Igor 
Primoratz, through which he proceeds in the formulation of four reasons that show state-
terrorism as morally worse than non-state-terrorism.33 The philosopher pointed out some 
very important arguments, to demonstrate the severity of the immorality of the 
phenomenon, and hence, he indirectly adds value to the validity and importance of the term. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The optic corner that this essay is viewing the phenomenon of terrorism is through its 
other hypostasis, of terrorism committed by the State, state-terrorism. By reversing the roles 
of the parties in a terrorist assault, where the State seizes to be the victim, and is a 
participatory party, but in the role of the perpetrator.  
Yet, it seems as if these phenomena have developed through time and practice an 
immune system against their legal analysis and criminal coding. Legal experts, lawmakers 
and academics have failed repeatedly to efficiently deal with the criminal analysis of the act 
itself, just as philosophers failed to theorize. The concept of terrorism travels around 
linguistics, political science, philosophy and law without a nuisance, and even the 
International Criminal Court failed till now to include the crime of terrorism in its 
jurisdiction34. Irrefutably, consensus on a legal definition of terrorism or state-terrorism 
within international law is yet to be reached35. 
 
 
28 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33167.htm [Retrieved on 06 July 2012]. 
29 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999. 
30 Sluka, J., ed., “Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror”, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. p. 8. 
31 Chomsky, Noam & Herman, Edward S., “The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism: The 
Political Economy of Human Rights: Vol. 1”. South End Press, 1979. 
32 Barsamian, D., “The United States is a Leading Terrorist State An Interview with Noam Chomsky”, 
Monthly Review, 2001. 
33 Primoratz, Igor. Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. . pp. 119-120. 
34 www.un.org/law/icc/statute/iccq&a.htm [Retrieved on 17 Sep. 2012]. 
35 www.icc-cpi.int/home.html&l=en [Retrieved on 04 May 2012]. 
Ti-Esti State-Terrorism?  
 
 
BAJO PALABRA. Revista de Filosofía 
II Época, Nº 10 (2015):107-122 
                                       
120 
Terrorism and state-terrorism are not easy subjects to work on, but at the same time the 
challenges surrounding their unclear properties, impose a duty upon academics to address 
the necessary questions in order to contribute in the scholarly labor process, in the 
production of knowledge, and eventually assist into the birth of a complete convention on 
international terrorism, leading the way into disrupting the silent consent to the 
international legal justice system’s current practice of law, which eclectically criminalizes 
the act, depending upon the perpetrator.  
In other words when the same terroristic act is committed by a State, there should be the 
same confrontation and punishment for the crime by the appropriate court, as if it has been 
committed by a private individual, a group of individuals or any other non-state actor. 
There has been a lot of ink used about terrorism, but in contrast, the bibliography on 
state-terrorism is limited and insufficient, plus, suspiciously neglected as a field of study. 
There is the urgent need for further research in order to outline the main problematics of 
these multidimensional and evolving polymorphic phenomena. It is important to note that 
terrorism as a phenomenon of this globalized and highly technological era, is a 
continuously evolving concept, a fact that holds a contributing role in the constantly 
procrastinating legal environment surrounding the concepts of terrorism and state-terrorism, 
and their not so different routes and roots. In terrorism, fear is the tool used for achieving 
the realization of the desired goals, and at the same time, fear is the re-action of the 
terroristic action. While, it should be highlighted that, terrorism cannot exist without the 
pre-given existence of the State, and apparently, we cannot really talk about terrorism 
outside the context of the State, they are bound to exist together in an interlinked and 
dependable relationship.  
I am referring to terrorism and state-terrorism as being in cases one, and the same 
phenomenon, while being termed differently allowing the circumstances. Allow me at this 
point to clarify, that while they are two different phenomena, it is the thesis of this paper to 
prove that, in the original terminological appointment, the Greeks, in aiming to describe the 
concept through the polysynthetic Greek language, constructed the term terrorism36 in order 
to describe firstly the terrorism employed by a State actor, and not by a criminal individual 
as in the modern established understanding. Governmental power of any sort, and terrorism 
were meant to share an unbreakable bond, a bond that has been broken by the unsuccessful 
transliteration of the term from Greek into Latin, and consequently into the majority of the 
western languages. Yet, state-terrorism is the worst, most dangerous and greatly immoral 
form of terrorism. 
Apart from the significance of history and the past in my research, I should note the 
importance of the future, which is also a motivating power inherently underlying my 
scholarly engagement. The future that is connected to the prevention of human rights 
violations, a prevention that can be an important instrument and could have great effect on 
the future. “Prevention that also means to address the root causes of systematic human 
rights violations.”37 In this sense it is important and necessary to address the practice of 
state-terrorism as the roots and cause of systematic human rights violations. 
The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights38 states: “freedom from 
fear”. While the drafters of this pioneering document explicitly condemn fear, they say 
 
36 Terrorism in Greek is the word tromocratia, or terrorcracy. 
37 Nowak, Manfred, “Introduction to the Human Rights Regime”, The Raoul Wallenberg Institute For Human 
Rights Library, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2003, p. 341. 
38 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 
217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
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nothing on state-terrorism, although it would be rational to expect a condemnation of the 
phenomenon in a document that was drafted in the aftermath of the worst form of state-
terrorism the world has ever faced, under the Nazi’s atrocious violence. I have not met a 
satisfying answer, to justify the neglected by legal experts, state-terrorism. Politics are 
being ruled by different ethics than law, therefore the marriage of law and politics under the 
need to give birth to international law has produced more suspicious paradoxes than it 
actually solved. 
However, irrespectively of means and perpetrators, we are facing at an interference with 
the individual’s enjoyment of fundamental rights necessary for the fulfillment of the 
person’s natural desire and need for freedom, and all the conditions that may contribute to 
the self-fulfillment, autonomy, and the development of her capabilities39 in order to render 
possible the individual’s unique blossoming into a society. From a human rights 
perspective, facing all this terror-phobia triggered by the counter-terrorism measures, and 
the total security obsession of the Western governments, it is apparent that we are 
witnessing a diminishment of the value of human rights.  
Still, a law with universal applicability, explicitly forbidding state-terrorism, do not 
exist. A law with the legitimation that organizations such as the United Nations can 
provide, or with enforceability in the International Criminal Court. The postponing 
international legal setting, cannot serve as an excuse for the neglected issue of criminalizing 
state-terrorism, or for the diplomatic denial to bring it on the table, when discussing 
terrorism legislation. 
The urgency for scholarly engagement with the phenomenon have been advocated by 
some of the greatest minds of our times, and the screaming necessity for legal recognition 
of terrorism committed by state actors cannot be silenced no more.  
Under this logic, the establishment of a proven act of terrorism committed by a State 
actor ought to formulate state-terrorism, while trumping over the curtain of immunity and 
impunity of the perpetrators, whilst the possibility to bring a case in a court, in order for 
justice to be restored, should always be available. 
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